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RECENT MARKET EVENTS AND THE
FOUNDATION FOR GLOBAL MARKET CRISES:
HEDGE FUNDS*
Leon M. Metzger**

My role today is to give you an overview of the recent market
1
meltdown involving Long-Term Capital Management this past
fall. I think that most of those who will be speaking today will
* This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 1999.
** President, Paloma Partners Company, L.L.C., a manager of several
market neutral private investment companies that use sophisticated
investment techniques.
1. On September 23, 1998, with the encouragement of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, fifteen major banks injected $3.625 billion into
Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. [hereinafter LTCM], a private
investment fund engaged in highly leveraged securities transactions based on
advanced mathematical models, to prevent its collapse and potential default
on an estimated $125 billion it had borrowed on $2.2 billion in capital. See
Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters,so

the Fed PersuadesBig Banks to Ante Up; Firms to Lend $3.6 Billion as Long-

Term Capital Loses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1998 at Al
(reporting on an "extraordinary gathering" in which the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York persuaded large banks to invest over $3.5 billion in LTCM
in return for a 90% ownership stake, and to prevent a financial crisis should it
unwind its positions); Steven Mufson, What Went Wrong? Fund's Big Bettors
Learned that Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. PosT, Sep. 27, 1998, at H1
(corrected Sep. 29, 1998) (listing fourteen major banks and institutions which
invested a total of $3.6 billion); Steven Syre, Fleet, BankBoston in Syndicate
Backing Troubled Hedge Fund,BostoN GLOBE, Sep. 26, 1998, at Fl (reporting
that Fleet Financial Group had loaned $25 million to LTCM as part of the
bail-out); Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund's Bets Now
Estimated at $1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 26, 1998, at Al (citing financiers'
estimates that LTCM had leveraged borrowings of $125 billion into $1.25
trillion in open trading positions). For comprehensive information on LTCM's
background and near-collapse, see Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked;
N.Y. TIMns, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6, at 24; Carol J. Loomis, A House Built on Sand,
FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110; Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan & Mitchell
Pacelle, All Bets are Off. How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at
Long-Term Capital;WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,1998, at Al.
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cover some of the aspects of my overview in greater detail.
Before I tell you what went wrong, let me talk to you about what
I will call "the state of the world."
THE

INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE AND HEDGE FUNDS

We are now dealing in an international marketplace. If
someone sneezes in Asia, we will catch a cold here in the United
States. We have sophisticated communications and computer
technology, and that has expanded cross-border investment and
trade. Technology has also increased the flow of information,
allowing markets to react more quickly and sensitively to the
slightest change.
What exactly are hedge funds? So much diversity exists in
the world of hedge funds that there is no established definition of
a "hedge fund." I will try, however, to give you a one-sentence
definition. Hedge funds are private investment companies,
usually in the form of partnerships, limited liability companies, or
offshore corporations, that may or may not employ "hedging"
strategies; they are largely, but not entirely, unregulated;
sometimes use leverage; use a variety of alternative investment
techniques, such as short-selling and derivatives, and often pay
handsome compensation to those who run them. 2
Why the use of leverage? Some market-neutral funds'

strategies seek to take advantage of what I call "small market

inefficiencies," which are two or more securities that are
statistically mispriced relative to each other.
Often, the
differences are so small that without the use of leverage, the
profits would not be acceptable to investors. Furthermore, these
trades with low profit margins are very low-risk trades, and,
therefore, more leverage would be reasonable. The amount of
leverage that is prudent in any situation depends upon the type of
trade. Riskier trades do not need as much leverage because there
is greater profit potential in the underlying trade itself. A fund
would use less leverage in higher-risk trades.
2. See Special: The Risk Business, ECONOMST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 21-22
(discussing common characteristics of hedge funds and the wide range of
strategies they employ).
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For example, Fortune magazine reported that for one trade
that Long-Term Capital Management made, the potential profit,
without leverage, was 67 basis points.3 If investors put money in a
fund and the rate of return is two-thirds of one percent, the
investors are just going to take their money and leave. If you
leverage that trade 30 times, however, you have a pretty good
rate of return, since two-thirds of one percent times 30 gives you
20 percent.
Using this type of strategy, you see a spread between the
yields of two securities; you believe that there is a high
probability that the spread will narrow to historical levels and
you try to profit from the narrowing spread. By way of
illustration, here is an example:
Figure 1

Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday

Closing $
Stock X
$10
$11
$10
$9
Expected
Closing $
$10

Closing $
Stock Y
$10
$9
$10
$11
Expected
Closing $
$10

Observe the dosing prices for the two stocks in Figure 1, X
and Y, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. You
would expect stock X to close at 10 and Y to close at 10 on
Friday. Since you think that stock X is under-priced and stock Y
is over-priced, your strategy at the opening of trading on Friday is
to buy stock X and sell short stock Y. If, in fact, you are correct,
and both close at 10 on Friday, you will have made one dollar on
X and you will have made one dollar on Y, so your net profit will
be two dollars. That is the type of trading that people try to do.
3. See Carol J. Loomis, supra note 1, at 114 (reporting that a LTCM top
manager expected an annual return of sixty-seven cents on each dollar at risk
in a certain investment).
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There are different types of strategies. The strategy I just

illustrated is called "statistical arbitrage."

It uses advanced

mathematical techniques and computer capabilities to identify
these price fluctuations.
A second is called "convertible-bond arbitrage," where you
buy a convertible bond and sell short the underlying common
stock, and again try to capture what you believe to be the relative
mispricing between the two securities. Figure 2 shows a simple
example of a convertible-arbitrage hedge in which an investor
simultaneously buys a bond for $1,000 and sells short the amount
of underlying stock that equals 80% of the value of the bond
($800 worth of stock). Both the proceeds from the short sale and
the bond earn interest. If interest rates are 10%, the investor
would earn $100 (10% of $1,000) on the bond plus $80 (10% of
$800) on the proceeds from the short sale less, say, $20 in expense
for borrowing the stock that was sold short. Accordingly, the
investor's static return on investment is 16% ($160 divided by
$1,000).
The profits from a convertible bond hedge may also be
substantial when the hedge is unwound. Since the market value
of convertible bonds is based, in part, on the value of the stocks
into which they are convertible, both classes of securities of the
same company usually move up or down in market value
together.
If the stock doubles in price (Scenario 1), the bond price will

tend to double as well, resulting in a $1,000 gain on the bond.
Conversely, the investor will repurchase for $1,600 the stock that
was sold short for $800, producing an $800 loss. Adding the bond
profit to the short sale loss would yield a $200 profit, besides the
16% yield.
On the other hand, should the stock price decline by 50%
(Scenario 2), the bond price will tend to fall as well, but at a
lesser rate, say 20%. It declines less than the stock because it is a
higher yielding instrument senior to the stock. This should result
in a $200 loss on the bond. Conversely, the investor might
repurchase for $400 the stock that was sold short, producing a
$400 gain. The net of the bond loss and short sale gain would
yield a $200 profit besides the 16% yield.
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Figure 2
Example

$1,000
$800
$0
$100
$60
$160
16%

Purchase Convertible Bond
Sell Stock Short
Dividend
Convertible Bond Yield (at 10%)
Short Rebate
Total Gain
Convertible Hedge Return (static)
Scenario 1
gain/
stock
loss
doubles

Scenario 2
gain/
stock
loss
declines
50%

Scenario 3
gain/
inverted
loss
market:
bonds
decline
while
stocks

rise
Sell Bond
Cover Short

+2,000
-1,600

+1,000
-800

+800
-400

-200
+400

+700
-850

-300
-50

Net from
Trading

+200

+200

-350

Bond Yield
(@10%)

+100

+100

+100

Short Rebate

+60

+60

+60

Total Gain

+360

+360

-190

Return

36%

36%

-4%.

On the other hand, should the stock price decline by 50%
(Scenario 2), the bond price will tend to fall as well, but at a
lesser rate, say 20%. It declines less than the stock because it is a
higher yielding instrument senior to the stock. This should result
in a $200 loss on the bond. Conversely, the investor might
repurchase for $400 the stock that was sold short, producing a
$400 gain. The net of the bond loss and short sale gain would
yield a $200 profit besides the 16% yield.
In the rare event that the bonds decline while the stocks rise
(Scenario 3), which is uncommon because the stock and
convertible-bond prices usually move in the same direction, then
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if the bond that was bought for $1,000 were worth $0.70 on the
dollar, the sale would produce a $300 loss. The investor would
also need to repurchase the $800 of stock that was sold short for a
higher price (assume $850), producing a $50 loss. The 16% yield
would not be enough to offset the bond and short-sale loss of
$350.
A third strategy type is called "fixed-income arbitrage,"
which involves the purchase of two bonds that are statistically
mispriced relative to each other. For example, historically the
yield of the sovereign debt from Country A is at, say, 25 basis
points above the equivalent U.S. Treasury security's yield. You
observe that the spread widens from 25 basis points to 75 basis
points. The trade, therefore, would be for you to go ahead and
buy the under-priced bond from Country A and sell short the
over-priced U.S. Treasury security, since you expect the spread to
drop to its historical level, from 75 to 25.
Traders use risk-assessment models to evaluate the risks of
their positions. The typical model looks at the events most likely
to occur. I assume that the traders did consider the possibility of
a market meltdown, but they probably did not, at least this past
summer, assign as much probability to a market meltdown as
they should have. The models may have tended to ignore the
low-probability, catastrophic, what I call "high stress" or "high
impact" type of events, and in these models, market crashes have
a low probability.
As I suggested when I illustrated Figure 1, relative-value
traders base future assumptions on the history of market spreads.
If the spreads were stable in the past, they are expected to revert
to -those stable levels. The traders also may assume that they can
exit their positions quickly. There may not have been that much
allowance for liquidity risk in the unlikely event of a worldwide
credit crunch. It is important to remember, however, that it is
impossible for any mathematical model to assess completely, in
advance, all possible risks that could occur in both usual, and
certainly in unusual, market conditions.
Besides "classic" hedge funds, it is fair to say that the
proprietary-trading desks of investment banks and commercial
banks are also hedge funds. They often take the same positions
as hedge funds, and sometimes they may even place those same
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trades using greater capital, and even greater leverage than the
hedge funds themselves. You do not get to hear about that,
however, because that information gets swallowed up in the
results of the bank.
THE CHAIN OF EvErs LEADING TO THE MELTDOWN
The chain of events began about one year ago. There were
problems in Asia. Currency crises led to an increase in emergingmarket bond yields." Then, Russia devalued its currency and
defaulted on its debt. 5 Although the Russian positions were not
large in world markets, they presented more problems because
there was suddenly a fear that other sovereign debt could also
default. Investors thought that the International Monetary Fund
("IMEF") would bail Russia out, but the IMF did not prevent the
default.6 This sparked a fear that other countries would not be
bailed out by the IMF, either.

In the United States, this resulted in a flight to quality! As
spreads widened, investors sold their emerging market debt
because of the increased risk. Furthermore, those who lost a

great deal in Russia sold in other markets to reflect their
diminished equity. Remember, if you are using leverage and you
4. See The Risk Business, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing the effect of
currency crises in 1998 on emerging-market bond yields).
5. See Regimes in a Fix: Adjustable Exchange Rates and Free Capital
Flows do not Mix. If Crises are to be Avoided, CountriesMust Choose Between
Them, FIN. TImsS, Aug. 19, 1998, at 18 (reporting that on ohe day in August
1998, Russian authorities caused a general default and abandoned its currency
stabilization policy by simultaneously devaluing its currency, restructuring its
domestic debt, and imposing capital controls as well as a ninety-day
moratorium on foreign commercial debt).
6. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Fundsand the Collapse of Long-Term
CapitalManagement, 13 J. EcoN. PERSP. 189, 203 (1999) (noting that prior to
Russia's default, international creditors and investors "may well have believed
that major western countries and the IMF would not permit a default by a
major country, like Russia, to occur.").
7. See Clay Harris, A Watershed Week for the World's Emerging
Markets- Contagion Russia 'Redefines International Financial Landscape',
FiN. TumEs, Aug. 29, 1998, at 2 (reporting that Russia's default and devaluation
caused investors to pull out of emerging markets in a "helter skelter 'flight to
quality.)").
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have to mark your securities to market, when some of your
securities drop in value, you must post additional margin to make
up for that drop; but to do that, you must sell other securities to
raise the cash. And what happens when there are a lot of sellers
but not too many buyers? The prices drop.
Because of the Russian default, some investment banks
refused to honor hedge contracts;8 the shock then drove yields on
dollar-denominated debt securities of emerging-market
economies sharply higher. Using the prior example, if your trade
was to buy Country A's sovereign debt and short the U.S.
Treasury, because of this crisis, the spread would widen from 75
to 150 basis points.
Two things were happening at the same time. Not only did
the spread indeed widen, but because of the flight to quality, U.S.
government yields declined and bond prices rose. Traders were
simultaneously betting that the price of the foreign debt would
rise and that the price of U.S. debt would decline. However, just
the opposite occurred: U.S. debt price rose and foreign debt
declined. This unusual widening of spreads was unexpected.
As a result, the market became more illiquid and the spread
rose to 300 basis points, then to 600 basis points. Well, at some
point, one's margin calls kick in and the position is no longer
maintainable. As prices dropped, the market became illiquid in
everything except for the safest securities worldwide, U.S.
Treasury bonds.9 Market makers feared trading because they did
not want to end up on the wrong side of the trade, which further
reduced liquidity.
Banks had many of the same positions as hedge funds. The
banks' risk management models ordered them to reduce their
risk, and that restrained traders from making bids, which further

8. See The Risk Business, supra note 2, at 23 (noting some investment
banks' refusal to honor hedge contracts on the basis that Russia's default was a
case of force majeure).
9. See Gregory Zuckerman & Greg Ip, Ripple Effect: It Isn't JustInvestors
who are Smarting from Liquidity Crunch; With Dealers Shunning Risk; WouldBe Bond Issuers, IPOs Feel Pinched, Too; A Word From Greenspan,WALL ST.

J., Nov. 6, 1998, at Al (noting that in August 1998, "[p]rofessionals wouldn't
touch anything but U.S. Treasury bonds, the world's safest investment.").
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reduced liquidity. ° Furthermore, the news of LTCM's problems
led some banks to assume that other hedge funds had huge loss
positions which needed to be unwound, so the banks tightened
credit to hedge funds through margin calls and changes in

haircuts." Some banks forced hedge funds to liquidate positions
to raise cash in an illiquid market, which caused a further drop in
prices.
What we saw was unprecedented, for all spreads to widen
simultaneously, resulting in a worldwide credit crunch. On top of
that, open-ended hedge funds that are not traded on an exchange
had to liquidate their positions to raise capital for year-end
withdrawals by investors, which meant they had to actually
realize the losses. They could not stay in these positions and wait
for the rebound because of the possibility that they would have to
cash out their investors.
It seems that Long-Term Capital Management had highlyleveraged positions, which might have caused price dislocations
in the markets if they were all liquidated at once. Banks may
have had to rescue LTCM because they held many of the same
positions. If LTCM had liquidated its positions in a fire sale,
causing prices to drop even further, banks could have lost
considerable amounts, which could possibly have caused them to
become insolvent.
TiE

AFrERMATH: CALLS FOR REGULATION

Hedge funds and leverage were used as scapegoats by many
in the government and in the media. Many argued that the
overuse of leverage could bend the financial markets, and debate
arose about whether leverage should be regulated.

10. See The Risk Business, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that liquidity was
tightened due to the response of banks' risk-management models in the wake
of the Russian default).
11. "Haircuts" refers to the "formulas used in the valuation of securities
for the purpose of calculating a broker-dealer's net capital." BARRoN's
DIcTioNARY OF FIN. & INv. TARms 252 (5th ed. 1998). "The haircut varies

according to the class of a security, its market risk, and the time to maturity."
Id.
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The lessons of 1994, when we had problems with the use of
derivatives, taught us that there should not be regulation in

response to what happened." In 1994, hedge funds and banks
were much better off being self-regulated.
Better risk
management practices were implemented, and greater
transparency was introduced. The process of self-improvement
has already begun; there has been a response. Hedge funds have
de-leveraged, they have moved away from risk, and they have
promoted transparency by opening their books to their
counterparties. Regulations would only drive hedge funds
offshore, where they will be less supervised than they are today
and still maintain the same market influence.
I am not an advocate of regulation, but I say that if there is
going to be regulation, it has to be coordinated with other major
financial centers' in other countries. 3 If we do not have
international regulation, say, coordinated by the Bank of
International Settlements, or all countries agreeing that these are
the rules, an arbitrage situation will arise. Those countries that
regulate will lose the business and those countries that do not
regulate or regulate less will attract the business.
The meltdown resulted from a combination of hedge funds
that were perhaps over-everaged, at the same time as what I'll
call a "feeding frenzy" occurred. The competition among lending
institutions for the business of some funds that wanted to borrow
was so fierce, that some lenders' standards may have been

compromised. You can blame the hedge funds, but at the same
time, perhaps, the creditors should be guilty of lending without
doing enough due diligence.

12. En 1994, three large hedge funds managed by David Askin were
liquidated due to a bond market crash, and congressional hearings were
conducted to examine whether greater regulation of hedge funds was
necessary to protect financial markets. See, e.g., Hedge Fund Activities in the
U.S. Financial Markets: Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking,
Financeand UrbanAffairs, 103 Cong. (1994).
13. See Stephen Fay, How to Control Hedge Funds; The Head of the FSA
Tells Steven Fay that only Concerted InternationalRegulation Can Rein in the
Masters of the Universe, INDEP. (London), Oct. 18, 1998, at 26 ("[H]edge Funds
can only be regulated internationally. If standards are not uniform in all major
markets, the funds will do business where regulation is least robust.").
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Hedge funds are good for our economy. They provide
liquidity to the marketplace. They take the side of the trade that
others do not want to take. Hedge funds make markets more
efficient because they find assets whose prices are temporarily
out of line with fundamental values and they help establish the
true market value of those assets. A May 1998 study published
by the International Monetary Fund found that, in 14general, hedge
funds make financial markets more stable, not less.
CONCLUSION.

I shall conclude with a couple of personal observations. The
first one is that I receive a lot of questions like, "How could a
market-neutral fund lose money?" My response is that if a
market-neutral fund cannot lose money, then how can it make
money?
Market-neutral does not mean that there is no
possibility of loss; it means that strategies do not depend upon
the direction of the market for profit.
The second observation is, as you may have read in the
media, that some of LTCM's principals had invested virtually all
of their own personal capital in the fund. People say, "Well, why
would they do that? What about diversification?" Actually,

LTCM's portfolio was diversified.

LTCM was in multiple

markets, whether it was fixed income or convertible arbitrage,
whether it was in the United States, Asia, or Europe. The
principals probably felt that they were diversified, but they did
Investors feel
not expect a worldwide liquidity crunch.
comfortable when they know that the principals have invested
their own money alongside that of investors, which is why it
should not appear unreasonable to you.
Third, I think one of the effects of the fallout is that there will
be changes to the tax laws, if not immediately, then within a
couple of years. You have probably read that the principals of
LTCM, through a bank, ended up doing some sort of trade where
they essentially had a call option on their own profits that would
14.
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have paid them LTCM gains in seven years."
I think the
Government has focused on that and is not happy about that
result.
The last thing I want to say is that I dealt with the media a
lot, and, by and large, they acted responsibly. Occasionally, in
the rush to get stories on the wires, in such a competitive
business, there was sloppy reporting.
However, with few
exceptions, the mainstream press was quite accurate and quite
responsible in its reporting of what happened.

15. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Laderman, Finance:Hedge Funds; UBS FailedRisk
Management 101, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 1998, at 162 (reporting that in 1997,
LTCM's top managers purchased call options on LTCM's stock from UBS for
$266 million).

